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ESSAY
THE NEW LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
CHARLES W. COLLIERt
Is affirmative action inherently preferential, discriminatory,
and thus inconsistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection? This question is basic to the legal discussion of affir-
mative action, and yet it seems to me that it has not been ade-
quately addressed, much less analyzed. Clearly, there is no short-
age of individual abuses and misuses in the name of "affirmative
action," and these have been amply documented elsewhere.' My
primary concern is with what might be termed the "logic" of affir-
mative action.
This task may seem somewhat quixotic in the face of a wide-
spread but unexamined assumption by affirmative action's critics
that it is-and by its supporters that it is not-intrinsically and
inevitably preferential or discriminatory. But I proceed on the
highest authority. The Supreme Court has recently declared that
any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under
the strictest judicial scrutiny. . . . [T]he Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups...
to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws
has not been infringed. These ideas have long been central to
this Court's understanding of equal protection, and holding "be-
nign" state and federal racial classifications to different standards
does not square with them.2
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And President Clinton has subsequently qualified his ringing en-
dorsement of affirmative action with the pledge that
[affirmative action] does not mean, and I don't favor, the unjusti-
fied preference of the unqualified over the qualified of any race
or gender. It doesn't mean-and I don't favor-numerical quotas.
It doesn't mean, and I don't favor, rejection or selection of any
employee or student solely on the basis of race or gender with-
out regard to merit.3
I begin by considering a few working definitions of affirmative
action, then proceed to analyze some of their broader implications.
In the course of the discussion, I make use of social psychology
and value theory to explain why adherence to a nonpreferential,
nondiscriminatory model of affirmative action is so difficult.
I. WORKING DEFINITIONS
Definition 1. Among qualified candidates (applicants, etc.), affir-
mative action means that the underrepresented candidate(s)
should get the nod.
Among the observations that might be made of this definition,
one is that it does not explicitly try to avoid being "preferential"
at all. A fair number of practices loosely labeled "affirmative ac-
tion" probably proceed under some such definition. And it is not
clear that this is improper, at least given certain assumptions. The
first assumption is that "qualifications" may be viewed as an all-or-
none classification rather than a matter of degree. That assumption
might be unobjectionable in certain occupational fields in which
qualifications are either very specific or merely very low. In this
sense, one is either a "qualified" street sweeper or not, and it
(impliedly) makes no sense to speak of a "better" or "worse"
street sweeper. (Socrates spoke in this fashion when suggesting
that a bad street sweeper is not "really" a street sweeper at all
but rather a poor imitation of one.) The second assumption is that
all qualified street sweepers are more or less interchange-
able-which may also be arguable.
3. Todd S. Purdtim, President Shows Fervent Support for Goals of Affirmative Ac-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Al, B10.
[Vol. 45:559
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Be that as it may, one does not have to depart far from the
level of lowly qualifications to find this first definition of affirma-
tive action unrealistic and therefore unsatisfactory. President
Clinton states that "[affirmative action] does not mean ... the un-
justified preference of the unqualified over the qualified of any
race or gender."4 But rarely is one faced with the choice between
an unqualified and a qualified candidate. The real choice is be-
tween candidates of better or worse (or simply different) qualifica-
tions. And this brings us to a second working definition:
Definition 2. Among equally qualified candidates, affirmative ac-
tion means that the underrepresented candidate should get the
nod.5
Sometimes this notion is expressed in the form: "All things
being equal . . . ." And if they were, affirmative action might be
viewed as a relatively unproblematic "tie breaker." But when was
the last time that all things really were equal? Since our inquiry is
logical and definitional, we must pursue this question seriously. Let
us imagine two candidates for a law school teaching position, John
and Jane, who attended the same elementary, junior high, and
high school, and graduated with the same grade point average.
John played first clarinet in the high school orchestra and Jane
played first flute; they were co-captains of the chess team, and
they drew every game between them. At Amherst, John showed
more interest in biochemistry, and Jane took a decided liking to
Renaissance art, but it was probably a wash since they attended all
the same classes and graduated with the exact same grade point
average. At Stanford Law School, John and Jane were moot court
team partners, received identical grades in all the same courses,
and ended up in a photo-finish tie in the annual greased watermel-
on-rolling contest. Does affirmative action mean that Jane should
get the nod?
Interviewers were puzzled by their virtually identical "qualifi-
cations" but nonetheless noted some subtle, almost intangible
differences of nuance. John seemed to shine more when discussing
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Calvin 0. Butts III & Douglas E. Krantz, Lawsuits Don't Tell Affirma-
tive Action Story; Mirror of Diversity, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1995, at A24 ("Affirmative ac-
tion means that when there are two equally qualified candidates for admission to a uni-
versity, for a promotion in a job or for a bank loan, then the equally qualified candidate
from the minority group receives the promotion, the admission or the loan.").
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the intricacies of muddled tax opinions; Jane seemed to want to
rewrite them from a policy perspective. And so forth. In other
words, all things are never equal. And not only that: All things
are never even remotely close to being equal, even in the most
narrowly defined context possible and even for the most limited
purposes imaginable. To pursue the matter in this direction is to
pursue a "legal fiction" of the first order. Unless affirmative action
really is inherently preferential, it cannot make use of this spurious
construct of equality.
Faced with imponderables like these, the debate over logical
definitions of affirmative action takes perforce a more realistic
turn, as exemplified by a third working definition:
Definition 3. Among unequally qualified candidates, affirmative
action means that underrepresented status serves as a "plus fac-
tor" that may elevate an (otherwise) less qualified candidate over
(otherwise) more qualified candidates. (This appears to be the
definition favored by former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.)6
This definition may be regarded as a more refined (and less naive)
version of the first definition; it likewise does not explicitly try to
avoid being "preferential." Alternatively, this definition may be
interpreted as making underrepresented status itself into a substan-
tive qualification or "credential," so that the problem of unfair
preference or discrimination is not directly presented.
Nevertheless, this definition comes hedged with a number of
seemingly stringent conditions:
3(a). The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same
protection, then it is not equal.7
3(b). It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal pro-
tection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards
entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded oth-
ers.... [T]he difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial
review according to a perceived "preferred" status of a particular
racial or ethnic minority are intractable.8
6. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978).
7. Id. at 289-90.
8. 1& at 295.
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3(c). Preferring members of any one group for no reason other
than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This
the Constitution forbids.9
3(d). We have never approved a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the ex-
pense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.... Without such findings of constitutional or statuto-
ry violations, it cannot be said that the government has any
greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from
harming another."
3(e). Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups ... perceived
as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classifica-
tion that imposes disadvantages upon persons ... who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the [victims] are thought to have
suffered."
In the following sections, I explain why these conditions are so
difficult, if not impossible, to meet. In doing so, I also draw atten-
tion to the advantages of a final definition that largely avoids
these difficulties:
Definition 4. Affirmative action means equality of opportunity as
opposed to equality of outcome.
This definition has an impressive legal pedigree, going back to
the concern in Carolene Products with the structure of politics, and
ranging forward to John Hart Ely's notion of "policing the process
of representation." Affirmative action in this sense may be defined
as policing the process of selection: not in order to determine or
even influence the outcome of that process (on the analogy to
determining the outcome of an election), but simply to ensure that
the process of selection is rigorously fair.
In what follows, I shall be concerned primarily with this "pro-
cess-based" version of affirmative action. This version appears to
hold the greatest promise of meeting the higher standard set out
by the President and the Supreme Court.
9. AL at 307.
10. Id at 307-09.
11. Id. at 310.
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II. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN A ZERO-SUM WORLD
A few examples will help clarify the difference between equal-
ity of outcome and process-based equality of opportunity.
Example 1. Mary, a kindergarten school teacher, decides one day
to dispense lollipops to some of her favorite pupils. It happens
that they are all white boys, but this does not deter her because
that is not why they were chosen (she insists). This is merely her
special new way of recognizing those pupils who have been espe-
cially pleasing to her.
We can imagine the following dialogue ensuing:
Mary: "Now class, as you know, I have given lollipops to
some of you who have been especially pleasing to me."
Pupil (not chosen): "But teacher, isn't this awfully preferen-
tial and discriminatory, even racist and sexist?"
Mary: "Not necessarily. Such factors didn't even figure in
my decision."
Pupil: "Well, how do you think it makes the rest of us
feel?"
Mary: "It seems to me you shouldn't feel any different than
usual. You were never given lollipops in kindergarten, and never
had any reason to expect any. Lollipops are completely optional
and discretionary, not a normal part of kindergarten. Objectively,
nothing has happened to you at all. You should feel just fine."
Pupil: "But how can we? We feel just horrible watching
your chosen few sucking on their delicious lollipops! We feel that
we have been terribly and unfairly penalized!"
Mary: "I'm sorry if you feel that way but, if you do, it is
because (as the Supreme Court once wisely put it) you 'choose[]
to put that construction upon it.' ,,12
Mary's protestations notwithstanding, what clearly emerges here is
that one's status may be devalued indirectly-i.e., in relation to
that of others-without any overt disfavoring or direct discrimina-
tion "against" anyone.
Example 1 (continued). The next day, in response to rising re-
sentment among her pupils and an increasingly uneasy admin-
istration, Mary organizes a random drawing to distribute addi-
tional lollipops to her pupils. Before the drawing, all the pupils
12. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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agree that the selection procedure is random. Nevertheless, only
a few more pupils receive lollipops under the new procedure.
Mary: "Well, are you satisfied now?"
Pupil (still not chosen): "I suppose it is better to suffer for
no reason at all than for a bad reason, but in any case we still
feel just as bad and we think it's just as unfair that we should
have to suffer."
Mary: "Unfair? You all agreed beforehand that the selection
procedure was random. Would you feel better if no one got lolli-
pops or if I took away the lollipops I've already given to your
lucky classmates? The technical term for that is Schadenfreude
('the perverse pleasure at the misfortune of another'), which we'll
study later."
Mary's more or less unconvincing explanation illustrates the
difficulty-perhaps the impossibility-of assessing one's situation in
isolation. There is always a "baseline" of reasonable expectations
from which departures, for better or worse, are measured, and
these expectations are formed largely in terms of one's relevant
peer group. 3 Value is in this sense relational-even without an
explicit element of competition, but especially when one is intro-
duced:
Example 2. Martin, a concerned law professor, is concerned
about evidence that women do worse in law school than men. 4
He announces to his class: "From now on, women will be given
ten extra points on exams. This will not affect the men, who will
continue to be graded exactly as before."
While no one has seriously proposed anything quite like this
as a form of affirmative action, the example illustrates an explicitly
relational value system. And of course, Martin's assurances to the
men are absurd. The men are all "affected"-indeed harmed-by
this elevation of their competition, even if Martin assigns them
exactly the same grades they would have received anyway. Their
grades have all been devalued-even if they do not realize it, even
if they do not complain about it, even if they do not care. Their
place in the grading "system" has changed for the worse, and if
13. See generally W.G. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1966); 1 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DUR-
ING ARMY LIFE (1949).
14. E.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994).
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Martin's practice catches on, their grade point averages will soon
start looking even less impressive than they now do.
Example 3. A university-let's call it "the University of Massa-
chusetts at Boston"-has limited funds for bringing appointments
candidates to campus. It decides to pay the travel costs for mi-
nority candidates only. White candidates are free to apply and to
interview on campus-if they can get there. (Let's assume also
that some other universities don't pay for anyone's travel expens-
es.) A university spokesman explains that "[g]iven our tight bud-
gets, we felt this was fair."15
Quite apart from the public relations problem, is this preferential
or discriminatory treatment? Before answering, let's consider an
analogous but even closer case suggested by Richard Delgado:
Example 4. Rodrigo, a law professor of African-American ances-
try, was hired as a "special opportunity" appointment. Rodrigo
recounts how he justified this to a Polish colleague who had not
been eligible for such an appointment, even though his own par-
ents emigrated to this country when he was two, were poor, and
lived in a rough neighborhood: "I told him that I saw no prob-
lem with my being hired that way if the school used the special
funds the president's office was making available to hire an addi-
tional professor that they otherwise would not have been able to
hire." Delgado summarizes with approval: "In other words, you
didn't displace anyone, not even the proverbial 'more highly
qualified white.' ,16
Without wishing to appear ungenerous, I think it is worth
pondering how such an appointment program would have to be
analyzed at the university level ("the president's office"). Presum-
ably, for every such appointment made, one fewer appointment of
equal cost could be made on a race-neutral basis-the world of
university finances is also a zero-sum world." Someone was in
effect "displaced" on a racially discriminatory basis, even if Rodri-
15. Unequal Travel Expenses at UMass Boston, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at B7.
16. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83
GEO. L.J. 1711, 1713-14 (1995).
17. See, e.g., Hans Gesund, Letter to the Editor, YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Summer
1995, at 10, 10-11 ("All universities suffer from 'insufficient' budgets. There is never
enough money to do all the things the various constituencies of the institution demand.").
For the rudiments of zero-sum theory, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS 56-87 (1957); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR §§ 4.2, 5.2 (3d ed. 1980).
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go himself was not directly competing against anyone. And even
Rodrigo seems to acknowledge this: "I, as an African-American,
was eligible for preferential treatment."'" The same analysis might
be extended even to such apparently benign institutions as race-
based orientation, advising, tutoring, and scholarship programs.
In the search for a nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory model
for affirmative action we are once again driven, it seems, to an
essentially "procedural" model, as illustrated by the final example:
Example 5. A fishing crew is charged with the mission of bring-
ing in the best fish-of whatever variety-that it can catch. It
appears from an investigation that the habitats of certain types of
fish are being systematically overlooked, primarily because of
certain long-standing but scientifically unsubstantiated supersti-
tions of the crew. The new captain decrees that, henceforth,
every effort will be made to ensure that these previously neglect-
ed fish are sought out with a vigor roughly approximating their
known incidence.
This model is procedural in assuming that the criteria of a
"good" fish are not species-dependent and can be agreed upon
independently. The example also illustrates the notion of "ratio-
nal expectations," both in its rejection of irrational selection crite-
ria and in tailoring efforts to their probable yield. Rational expec-
tations refer to the prospect of receiving what one seeks, as dis-
counted by the mathematical probability of receiving it.2' (In a
typical state lottery, for example, one has a "rational expectation"
of receiving about fifty cents in return for every dollar wagered,
even though no one ever actually receives this amount.) In the
fishing example, it would be irrationally preferential and discrimi-
natory to expend efforts searching for fish in any habitat beyond
what those efforts could rationally be expected to yield. This is so
because every effort made to find one type of fish means less time
and effort available for finding other fish.
18. Delgado, supra note 16, at 1713.
19. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 14 (1971).
20. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND
IT'S APPLICATIONS 220-23 (3d ed. 1968); IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILI-
TY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND
STATISTICAL INFERENCE 92-101 (1975). See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SI-
RENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984); JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS & BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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I shall analyze the implications of this model for affirmative
action in the following section.
III. CASTING A WIDER NET
In a long and thoughtful article entitled What Happened to the
Case for Affirmative Action?, Nicholas Lemann articulates what he
terms a "core principle" of affirmative action:
It's healthy to have some way of pushing people, as they make
hiring and contracting and admissions decisions, to go far enough
past the bounds of their ordinary realm of contacts to find black
candidates. Even the opponents say they want this, but it won't
happen if it's not required because the black-white social gulf is
so great.2
The metaphor of "casting a wider net" responds to the virtually
universal social dynamics of insularity captured in such phenomena
as favoritism and nepotism, in-groups and out-groups, and the gen-
eral hostility to anything foreign or alien.' These phenomena fall
naturally on a continuum, ranging from mere ignorance and unfa-
miliarity to distrust and suspicion to outright hatred and aversion.
Our term outlandish, for example, starts out meaning (literally) "of
or belonging to a foreign country"; it then takes on connotations
of "unfamiliar or strange" and "hence ... odd, bizarre, uncouth,"
as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it. What originally meant
merely "far removed from civilization" is used "now usually in a
derogatory sense." '
The metaphor of casting a wider net governs the entire range
of prejudice-based phenomena. To the extent that the problem is
merely one of neutral unfamiliarity or ignorance, the metaphor
provides a rational corrective in the form of more inclusive meth-
odologies. To the extent that the problem is one of overt hostility
21. N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 11, 1995, at 36, 62.
22. See, e.g., T.W. ADORNO ET AL, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950);
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); NORBERT ELIAS & JOHN L.
SCOTSON, THE ESTABLISHED AND THE OUTSIDERS: A SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO
COMMUNITY PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND,
MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE (1929); GUNNAR
MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944); Robert K. Merton, Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowl-
edge, 78 AM. J. SOC. 9 (1972).
23. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1021 (2d ed. 1989).
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and aversion, it places procedural obstacles in the way of irrational
limitations on the field of inquiry.
The social psychology of insularity is well recognized in Amer-
ican legal doctrine. In the context of pondering stricter scrutiny of
"legislation which restricts those political processes [such as voting,
expression, and political association] which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," the
Carolene Products Court famously pondered
whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial mi-
norities ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minor-
ities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 4
In the present context, discreteness, insularity, and prejudice tend
to set irrational (and perhaps unconscious) limits on the methodol-
ogy of selection; affirmative action may be viewed as a form of
"strict scrutiny" to ensure that selection procedures conform to
rational expectations based on all available information. To return
to the fishing analogy, it would be irrational to confine one's ef-
forts to certain familiar habitats in the face of credible evidence
that other equally good habitats were being systematically neglect-
ed.
The criteria for evaluating the results of a procedural theory
are themselves necessarily procedural; or, as Ely has put it, "[I]f a
theory is sound, we should live with the results."' No one would
dream of contesting the results of an election on the ground that
the "preferred" candidate lost. Similarly, while a criminal convic-
tion is invalid when members of the defendant's race are excluded
by law from jury duty, the same conviction arrived at by the same
jury chosen under fair and race-neutral jury selection procedures
would be upheld.26 So too with affirmative action: "Results" can-
24. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (citations
omitted).
25. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 152 (1980).
26. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("[Iln holding that petit juries
must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no re-
quirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the
various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any
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not be relevant as a criterion of procedure; they neither confirm
nor disprove that affirmative action procedures are being conduct-
ed in a nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory manner. At most, out-
comes that are wildly at variance with rational expectations suggest
the need for more up-to-date empirical information to revise and
inform expectations; they do not suggest that those procedures
should conform to something other than informed, rational expec-
tations.
This is a difficult implication of my discussion, and it runs up
against common intuitions. Here, for example, is how a typical law
school's faculty appointments committee was instructed by its
dean:
I ask the committee to continue the College's commitment
to the hiring of women and minority law teachers. This must be
a matter of very high priority in order for us to be successful.'
It is not at all clear that this commitment could be met in a
nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory manner. Nor is it clear what
"successful" means in this context. Could a procedurally fair selec-
tion procedure that conformed to rational expectations be pro-
nounced "successful" even if it nevertheless yielded no women or
minority law teachers? If not, then some notion of equality or pro-
portionality of outcomes or results is implicitly being substituted
for equality of opportunity as described above.
Another distortion of affirmative action may be described as
"overcorrection," and it too derives strength from common intu-
itions. This phenomenon may perhaps best be illustrated by juxta-
posing the nondiscrimination standard of the Association of Amer-
ican Law Schools, as published in its Placement Bulletin, with the
affirmative action statement in a typical job advertisement in that
same bulletin:
Unless otherwise expressly stated, all institutions announcing
positions herein have adopted and pursue policies not to discrimi-
nate on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex, age, hand-
icap or disability, or sexual orientation ....
particular composition ...."); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 343 (1970) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting in part); Swain v. Ala., 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965); Strauder v. W.
Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
27. Memorandum on file with the author.
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UC Davis has a strong institutional commitment to diversity
among its faculty and staff. In that spirit, we are particularly
interested in receiving applications from persons of underrepre-
sented groups, including women, persons of color, special dis-
abled veterans, Vietnam era veterans, and persons with dis-
abilities.s
It would be a rare individual indeed who could combine these two
mandates in a nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory manner. (It goes
without saying that the UC Davis Law School is "not particularly
interested in receiving applications from white males.") Those
things that are most highly sought out are commonly and naturally
assumed to be the most valuable. In fact, it is precisely because
they are most highly sought out that they are most valuable. If
diamonds suddenly became as common as pebbles, their value
would plummet accordingly; it is their relative scarcity-and the
greater labor expended in finding them-that accounts for their
high value.? It would thus be highly counterintuitive to expect
that someone, after being instructed to place the highest priority
on searching for something, could then step back and maintain a
kind of detached neutrality as to the results of that search." But
this is precisely the sort of "cognitive dissonance" affirmative ac-
tion entails. The fishing analogy, for example, might play out as
follows:
First Mate: "Well, lads, you've heard the captain's new or-
ders. We've been neglecting certain varieties of perfectly good
fish, and that won't do. In the future, you will seek out those
previously neglected fish 'with a vigor approximating their known
incidence.'"
Second Mate: "Sir, what does that mean in practice? Are we
supposed to make extra special efforts to find those underrepre-
sented fish?"
First Mate: "I'm asking the entire crew to support the
captain's commitment to finding and catching those previously
28. AALS PLACEMENT BULLETIN 1, 2 (Oct. 7, 1994).
29. See Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506 (1871) (finding that, in gathering up
a quantity of horse manure, plaintiff had "changed its original condition and greatly en-
hanced its value by his labor"); JOHN LOcKE, Second Treatise of Government in Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 285, 303-20 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690); 1
KARL MARX, CAPITAL 8-9 (Ernest Rhys ed. & Eden & Cedar Paul trans., J.M. Dent &
Sons Ltd. Books 1930) (1867).
30. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-31 (1957).
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neglected fish. This must be a matter of very high priority in
order for us to be successful. So, do whatever it takes, but don't
go overboard (if you know what I mean)."
Second Mate: "Does this mean we are changing our criteria
for a good fish? Or are the new fish actually better?"
First Mate: "Why do you think we are looking so hard for
them?! All I know is that the captain would be mighty pleased
to see you bring in some of those new fish!"
In this example, as in the real world, what started out as a selec-
tion methodology guided by rational expectations as to what it can
yield has been obscured and distorted in perfectly understandable
ways by the workings of social psychology. The "First Mate" is pat-
terned on the bureaucratic intermediary who converts a procedural
mandate into the hard currency of outcomes, which can then most
easily be achieved by "overcorrecting" in preferential or discrimi-
natory fashion.
In the real world, this plays out as follows:
To its credit, the Appointments Committee did look primarily at
minority candidates. In my view, this is no more unusual than
the fact that in some years the Committee looks primarily for
torts teachers or clinicians, depending on the needs of the institu-
tion. 1
In other words, minority status has been translated into a "creden-
tial" like expertise in torts.32 If this were accepted, then the issue
of preference or discrimination would have been finessed since
everyone agrees it is permissible-indeed, obligatory-to discrimi-
nate on the basis of legitimate credentials. But what this really
represents is the institutionalization of preference and discrimina-
tion, so that preferential and discriminatory decisionmaking even-
tually begins to seem "no more unusual" than the fact that earned
credentials are considered.
This institutionalization of preference and discrimination is
often justified in the name of enhancing diversity, which should
lead in turn to the breakdown of common stereotypes. But the
suggestion that unearned, immutable physical characteristics can
serve as a proxy for intellectual ability or as a substitute for ac-
complishment may be the unkindest stereotype of all.3 (And
31. Memorandum on file with the author.
32. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1801-07.
33. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 81 (1984) (Powell, J, concurring)
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even when it is accurate, the Supreme Court has ruled that such a
stereotype may not be acted on.34)
The nondiscrimination principle was originally premised on the
notion that, in order to extend the sphere of freedom, an enlight-
ened society should abstract as far as practicable from immutable
natural differences and physical limitations.5 More generally, the
gradual transcending of natural differences is one of the broadest
trends observable in the advance of civilization and one of those
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society., 36 It would represent a most unfortunate reversal of
those beneficent and civilizing trends if "biology is destiny" once
again became the inspiration for stereotyping and discrimination
based on immutable natural differences-even those viewed as
"credentials."
IV. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMAL DISCRIMINATION
Formal discrimination, it may be said, ended in America with
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 7 But of course all
discrimination did not promptly end once it had been made for-
mally illegal; "informal discrimination" of the sort found in atti-
tudes, unconscious predispositions, and the reinforcement of
society's cultural stereotypes continues to be a problem that has
been documented by critical race scholars. 8
("The qualities of mind, capacity to reason logically, ability to work under pressure, lead-
ership, and the like are unrelated to race or sex."); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 627-28 (1984) (declining to indulge in such "stereotyping"); see also City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 458-60 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
34. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978) ("Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disquali-
fying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply."); see also Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 201-04 (1976) ("Even were this statistical evidence accepted as accurate, it
nevertheless offers only a weak answer to the equal protection question presented
here .... [P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and
one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal
Protection Clause."); cf id. at 202 n.13 (discussing similar cases).
35. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879); Paul Brest, Fore-
word: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1976).
36. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See generally James Harvey Robinson,
Civilization & Culture, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 824 (14th ed. 1973).
37. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (barring discrimination in hiring, educa-
tion, housing, etc.).
38. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-
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Future historians will probably view the years 1995-96 as the
period when the preferential and discriminatory practices of affir-
mative action began to end. 9 But what will not have ended is an
exact correlate to the informal discrimination identified by the
critical race scholars. Likewise, and for the foreseeable future, the
informal discrimination associated with affirmative action will have
to be reckoned with.
This is not a minor or marginal problem. In the academy, at
least, it must be counted as an absolutely central concern. Three
factors conspire to make it so: (1) the relatively high level of qual-
ifications at issue; (2) the relatively small number of individuals
concerned; and (3) the widespread support for affirmative action in
academia, at least among those not affected by it.
The issue of affirmative action in academia is often under-
stood in terms of inclusion or inclusiveness. Thus, a university
president has stated:
Especially in a university, [affirmative action is] about creating
the best educational atmosphere for all students.' °
Similarly, a law professor has declared:
[A]fflirmative action ... doesn't just benefit minorities, it benefits
all students.... Bakke-like affirmative action on the Harvard
model brings us together.41
To view affirmative action in this way is to view it as presenting
solely issues of educational policy and to abstract entirely from
Speech Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1807 (1994); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cogni-
tive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Thomas F. Pettigrew, New
Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERs L. REV. 673
(1985); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action
Debate, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1283-89 (1995) (reviewing literature).
39. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Equal Op-
portunity Act of 1995, H.R. 2128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); B. Drummond Ayres Jr.,
California Board Ends Preferences in College System, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al;
see also B. Drummond Ayres Jr., California Acting on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1995, at Al (discussing California Civil Rights Initiative).
40. Peter Applebone, The Debate on Diversity in California Shifts, N.Y. TIMEs, June
4, 1995, at Al, A22. (quoting Chang-Lin Tien, Chancellor of the University of California
at Berkeley).
41. Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, School Colors, NEW REPUBLIC, July 17 & 24, 1995,
at 25.
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any legal or constitutional rights involved. The above statements
should therefore be corrected:
Especially in a university, [affirmative action is] about creating
the best educational atmosphere for those students who are ad-
mitted to the university.
[A]ffirmative action ... doesn't just benefit minorities, it benefits
all students who are admitted for study .... Bakke-like affirma-
tive action on the Harvard model brings those of us together
who are privileged to be here.
Only thus is the full issue presented for consideration.
To return to an earlier example: If large numbers of people
are applying to be street sweepers, and if (as I shall assume for
simplicity) the qualifications for such a job are fairly minimal, then
something would probably be seriously amiss if applicants were
not accepted in rough proportion to their race, sex, religion, etc.
The fact that there is not much of a "selection procedure" to
speak of here warrants a more outcome-oriented approach for as-
sessing the fairness of the selection. The "law of large numbers"
dictates that variations from expected frequencies should diminish
and virtually disappear when sufficiently large samples are generat-
ed on an essentially random basis.42
Situation 1. The city of New Angeles, one of the nation's largest
employers, hires about 1,000 street sweepers per year from an
applicant base of about 10,000. Where job qualifications are ei-
ther very specific or merely very low, the employment office is
authorized to make hiring decisions randomly-from among the
"qualified" applicants-by means of a special, computerized selec-
tion program; and most hiring decisions as to street sweepers are
in fact made this way.43
However, these conditions are rarely, if ever, approximated in aca-
demia, and something would be seriously amiss if they were. The
academic situation is more like the following:
Situation 2. Ivy Law School, one of the nation's leading institu-
tions, appoints about three new professors per year from an
42. See, e.g., FELLER, supra note 20, at 152-53, 202-04, 243-63; HACKING, supra note
20, at 154-65.
43. For the general idea, see JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN
THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 36-122 (1989).
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* applicant pool of about 1,000. In appointments matters, the Ivy
faculty has long had something of a bias in favor of its own
graduates (which it justifies on the ground that it is, after all, one
of the nation's leading institutions). The faculty follows an infor-
mal practice of trying to appoint at least one of its own gradu-
ates every year. As a result, almost half of Ivy's faculty members
are Ivy graduates.
This situation is governed by what might be termed the "law of
small numbers" because decisions of this sort are made on a high-
ly individualized, discretionary basis; here, something would proba-
bly be seriously amiss if the results did conform closely to statisti-
cal expectations. In fact, however, Ivy's own graduates are grossly
overrepresented on its faculty as a result of the slight preference
in their favor. If questioned, Ivy faculty members would doubtless
concede that their graduates are not inherently superior to those
of other leading institutions; however, those same faculty members
would probably see nothing wrong about giving a slight preference
to an Ivy graduate in a close case. This example, which is not
entirely hypothetical, illustrates the huge effects of informal dis-
crimination based on some factor other than merit in a situation in
which every case is "close." If every institution followed Ivy's
practice, the appointments process in general would have little
integrity.
Now consider the situation at a typical law school, as reported
by its appointments committee chairman:
First, the background. As you know, what has evolved in
the Committee's deliberations is a "white" standard and a
"black" standard as far as traditional bases for law school hiring.
It is pretty much this simple since white women, in my opinion,
are now held to the same standards as white men. If you have
any doubts about this, please feel free to view all the candidates
we interviewed in the context of all 1250 AALS sheets. ...
In my view the overriding rule in the Committee this year
was "no white men." Another outcome, and I am not sure how
this evolved, was "almost no white women." I observed the first
rule religiously but not the second. We did attempt to interview
one white male-Editor in Chief of the Yale Law Journal-but
he canceled.
My recollection is that, with a possible exception or two, we
did not interview a single black candidate who would have been
interviewed had he or she been white ... if we were considering
white candidates in the first place.
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* . . Probably all of us on the Committee struggled with this,
although we did not talk about it openly.'
Turn the clock back, reverse the races, and we have a picture
eerily reminiscent of the segregation era in this country.' While
this case is perhaps an extreme one, it falls squarely within the
familiar pattern of informal discrimination outlined above. The dis-
crimination at issue here is unwritten, unspoken, and undecided-
upon; it is the kind that lies in "attitudes, unconscious predisposi-
tions, that sort of thing," 6 and as such has no formal legal status.
Yet there can be no doubt that its effects are just as decisive and
pernicious as if the committee had publicly debated and officially
adopted the informal "rules" summarized by its chairman.
If every institution followed this practice, the appointments
process in general would obviously afford no equality of opportu-
nity at all. And there is little to prevent that result in the highly
individualized and discretionary context of academic decision-
making or to suggest that such a result would be surprising.' "If
universities are free to discriminate at all to admit members of
preferred groups, they will, as a practical matter, be able to dis-
criminate to whatever extent is necessary to admit the desired
numbers."'  I can thus claim only to have presented the elements
44. Memorandum on file with the author.
45. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) ("[T]he Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that petitioner be admitted to the Univer-
sity of Texas Law school."); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938)
("[P]etitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual that he was entitled to
the equal protection of the laws, and [to] facilities for legal education substantially equal
to those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race.
46. Delgado, supra note 16, at 1723.
47. See Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1192-1203; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered
Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1993) (describing "anonymous" judicial opinion on legality
of particular faculty appointments process).
48. Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Up-
held and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 87 (1995). For similar conclusions from
across the political spectrum, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MAFER OF PRINCIPLE
309-11 (1985); Lemann, supra note 21, at 54 ("[I]n admissions-office circles [Bakke] is
widely viewed as meaning that it's O.K. to reverse discriminate as long as you're not
really obvious about it."); Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of
Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1875 (1995) ("[T]he Harvard program was a more gen-
teel way of accomplishing the same results as the plan in Bakke, and . . . on the mar-
gins a plus factor has precisely the same effect as that plan; Powell's position was ...
'pure sophistry.' ").
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of nonpreferential, nondiscriminatory analysis for a legal regime of
the indefinite future.
It can no longer be maintained (at least not with a straight
face) that "[t]here is no compelling evidence that there is discrimi-
nation by race and gender in affirmative action. '49 In a zero-sum
world, for every "affirmative action" there is an equal and oppo-
site reaction. As one prominent law dean has candidly conceded
(even while defending his own institution's affirmative action pro-
gram in court), "One of the plain, unvarnished and difficult truths
about affirmative action is ... that there are 'innocent' victims.
They are denied opportunities they would otherwise have had.
There is no way of plastering over that reality. Too often we try
to make it appear to be a bloodless decision."5 This is evidently
also what the Supreme Court had in mind in a gender discrimina-
tion case:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex be-
cause of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility."51
The pervasiveness and severity of informal discrimination have
finally transformed what might have been viewed as a matter of
educational or public policy into a fundamental legal issue of civil
rights. It is finally time to debate this legal and constitutional issue
as such. And there is no longer any reason to apologize for oppos-
ing the evils of discrimination-in whatever form they take.
49. B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Affirmative Action's End? Now It's Not That Simple,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at Al, A10 (quoting the Rev. Jesse Jackson).
50. Ken Myers, Prospective Student's Lawsuit Is Sending U.T. Back to Bakke, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at A14 (quoting Acting Dean at University of Texas Law School, M.
Michael Sharlot). A faculty member on the law school's legal team was equally candid:
"Are there white applicants who were not admitted who would have gotten in if they
had been black? . . .The answer is clearly yes. That's the nature of a racial preference."
Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13,
1994, at B8 (quoting University of Texas Law School professor Samuel Issacharoff).
51. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 45:559
